- 1. "Laura,"
- 2. at this stage, I can offer
nothing more than my word.
- 3. I'm a senior government employee
in the intelligence community
- 4. I hope you understand that contacting
you is extremely high risk
- 5. and you are willing to agree
to the following precautions
- 6. before I share more.
- 7. This will not be a waste of your time.
- 8. The following sounds complex,
- 9. but should only take minutes to
complete for someone technical.
- 10. I would like to confirm out of email that
the keys we exchanged were not intercepted
- 11. and replaced by your surveillants.
- 12. Please confirm that no one
has ever had a copy of your private key
- 13. and that it uses a strong passphrase.
- 14. Assume your adversary is capable
of one trillion guesses per second.
- 15. If the device you store the private key
and enter your passphrase on
- 16. has been hacked,
- 17. it is trivial to decrypt
- 18. Understand that the above steps
are not bullet proof,
- 19. and are intended only to
give us breathing room.
- 20. In the end if you publish
the source material,
- 21. I will likely be immediately implicated.
- 22. This must not deter you from releasing
the information I will provide.
- 23. Thank you, and be careful.
- 24. Citizen Four...
- 25. surveillance
means that there are facts
- 26. under the law to apply to
- 27. if we should take away the surveillance
- 28. there are no facts the
government could manufacture.
- 29. Oh, that's right and it's all about
creating an independent record.
- 30. To me this goes to the question
- 31. of independently verifying
- 32. what the government is doing.
- 33. That's why I keep going
back to that question.
- 34. So, that was David Suruda.
After CBS News traffic and weather...
- 35. Hey, can you hear me?
- 36. I am here David, how are you?
- 37. Well, I would just point...
- 38. start by pointing to Barack Obama
himself said about those questions
- 39. when he was running for
the office that he now occupies.
- 40. On December 2007 he said
"The president does not have"
- 41. the power under the Constitution to
unilaterally authorize a military attack
- 42. in a situation that does not involve stopping
an actual or imminent threat to the nation...
- 43. So by Obama's own words, the president doesn't
have the power that he is now exercising
- 44. under the Constitution.
- 45. And as far of why it matters,
in... on August 1st 2007
- 46. when he laid out his reasons
why he was running for office
- 47. and why he thought it was so important
to change the way we were doing things
- 48. he said.
- 49. "No more ignoring the law
when it's inconvenient,"
- 50. that is not who we are.
- 51. We will again set an example for the world
that the law is not subject
- 52. "to the whims of stubborn rulers."
- 53. So to allow presidents to simply
start wars on their own without any...
- 54. For now, know that every border you
cross, every purchase you make,
- 55. every call you dial, every
cell phone tower you pass,
- 56. friend you keep, article you write,
- 57. site you visit, subject line you type,
- 58. and packet you route,
- 59. is in the hands of a system
whose reach is unlimited
- 60. but whose safeguards are not.
- 61. Your victimisation by the NSA system means
that you are well aware
- 62. of the threat
that unrestricted secret police pose
- 63. for democracies.
- 64. This is a story few, but you, can tell.
- 65. Thank you for inviting me here,
- 66. to give me the opportunity
to express my story.
- 67. But let me give you some of my background.
- 68. I spent about 4 years in the military
and then I went to NSA directly, so...
- 69. so I ended up with about 37
years of service combined.
- 70. Most of it was a lot of fun!
I tell you, it was really a lot of fun,
- 71. breaking these puzzles.
- 72. You know, solving problems
and things like that.
- 73. So, and that's really what I did.
- 74. Fundamentally started working with data,
looking at data and datasystems
- 75. and how you do that.
- 76. I was developing this concept of analysis
where you could lay it out in such a way
- 77. that it could be coded and executed electronically.
Meaning you could automate analysis.
- 78. And it has to do with metadata
and using metadata relationships.
- 79. So that was the whole,
that was my whole theme there at NSA
- 80. that was eventually what I ended up to, I was
the only one there doing that, by the way.
- 81. So any rate, you know, 9/11 happened.
- 82. And it must have been right after.
- 83. A few days, no more than a week after 9/11
- 84. that they decided to begin actively
spying on everyone in this country.
- 85. And they wanted that back part of
our program to run all the spying.
- 86. So that's that's exactly what they did.
- 87. And then they started
taking the telecom data,
- 88. and expanded after that.
- 89. So, I mean, the one I knew was AT&T,
- 90. and that one provided
320 million records every day.
- 91. That program was reauthorized
every 45 days by the,
- 92. what I call the "Yes Committee"
- 93. which way Hayden, and Tenet, and the DOJ,
- 94. that program was called STELLARWIND.
- 95. So first I went to the
House Intelligence Committee,
- 96. and the staff member I
personally knew there
- 97. and she then went to the Chairman
of that Committee, Nancy Pelosi,
- 98. who was the Minority Rep.
- 99. They were all briefed in to
the program at the time, by the way,
- 100. and all the other programs
that were going on,
- 101. including all those CIA programs.
- 102. I wasn't alone in this,
there were four others out of NSA,
- 103. we were all trying to work interally
in the government over these years
- 104. trying to get them to come around,
to being constitutionally acceptable,
- 105. and take it in to the courts
and have the courts' oversight of it too.
- 106. So we naïvely kept thinking
that that could, that could happen,
- 107. and it never did.
- 108. But any rate after that
and all the stuff we were doing
- 109. they decided to raid us
to keep us quiet,
- 110. threaten us, you know.
- 111. So we were raided simultaneously,
four of us.
- 112. In my case they came in
with guns drawn,
- 113. I don't know why they did that,
but they did. So...
- 114. "Laura,"
- 115. I will answer what I remember
- 116. of your questions as best I can.
- 117. Forgive the lack of
structure, I am not a writer,
- 118. and I have to draft this in a great hurry.
- 119. What you know as STELLARWIND has grown,
- 120. SSO,
- 121. the expanded Special Source Operations
that took over STELLARWIND's share
- 122. of the pie
- 123. has spread all over the world
- 124. to practically include
- 125. comprehensive coverage
of the United States.
- 126. Disturbingly, the amount
of US communication
- 127. ingested by NSA is still increasing.
- 128. Publicly,
- 129. we complain that things are going dark,
- 130. but in fact our accesses are improving.
- 131. The truth is that the NSA has never
- 132. in its history
- 133. collected more than it does now.
- 134. I know the location of most
domestic interception points,
- 135. and that the largest
telecommunication companies in the US
- 136. are betraying the trust of their customers,
- 137. which I can prove.
- 138. We are building the greatest weapon
for oppression in the history of Man.
- 139. Yet its directors
exempt themselves from accountability.
- 140. NSA director Keith Alexander
lied to Congress,
- 141. which I can prove.
- 142. Billions of US communications
are being intercepted.
- 143. In gathering evidence of wrongdoing
- 144. I focused on the wronging
of the American people,
- 145. but believe me when I say that
the surveillance we live under
- 146. is the highest privilege
compared to how we treat
- 147. the rest of the world,
- 148. this I can also prove.
- 149. On cyberoperations
the government's public position
- 150. is that we still lack a policy framework.
- 151. This too is a lie.
- 152. There is a detailed policy framework,
- 153. a kind of martial law for Cyber Operations
- 154. created by the White House.
- 155. It's called "Presidential
Policy Directive 20"
- 156. and was finalized at the end of last year.
- 157. This I can also prove.
- 158. I appreciate your concern for my safety,
- 159. but I already know how
this will end for me,
- 160. and I accept the risk.
- 161. If I have luck, and you are careful,
- 162. you will have everything you need.
- 163. I ask only that you ensure
- 164. this information makes it home
to the American public.
- 165. Does the NSA routinely intercept
American citizen's emails?
- 166. No.
- 167. Does the NSA intercept Americans'
cell phone conversations.
- 168. No.
- 169. Google searches?
- 170. No.
- 171. Text messages?
- 172. No.
- 173. Nope.
- 174. Bank records?
- 175. No.
- 176. What judicial consent is required for NSA
- 177. to intercept communications
- 178. and information
involving American citizens?
- 179. Within the United States
that would be the FBI lead.
- 180. If it was a foreign actor
in the United states
- 181. the FBI would still have the lead
and could work that with NSA
- 182. or other intelligence
agencies as authorized.
- 183. But to conduct that kind
- 184. of collection within the United states
- 185. it would have to go through a court order.
- 186. And the court would have to authorize it.
- 187. We are not authorized to do it,
- 188. nor do we do it.
- 189. All rise.
- 190. The United States Court of Appeals
- 191. for the Ninth Circuit is now in session.
- 192. Please be seated.
- 193. Good morning and welcome
to the Ninth Circuit.
- 194. The first case for argument is
Jewell vs. National Security Agency.
- 195. You may proceed.
- 196. May it please the Court,
Kevin Bankston for Carolyn Jewell
- 197. and her fellow plaintiff appellants
in Jewell vs. NSA.
- 198. Your Honors,
- 199. plaintiffs have specifically
alleged that their own communications
- 200. and communications records have been
acquired by the government.
- 201. But the District Court found that
we failed to allege facts
- 202. that differentiated the injury
of our plaintiffs sufferred
- 203. from the injury suffered
by every other AT&T user
- 204. whose communications and records
have been acquired by the government.
- 205. Basically concluding that so long as
every one is being surveilled,
- 206. no one has standing to sue.
- 207. However to deny standing to persons
who are injured simply because
- 208. many others are also injured
would mean that the most injurious
- 209. and widespread government actions
could be questioned by nobody.
- 210. Do they have anything concrete
that in fact a specific communication
- 211. of your client was intercepted?
- 212. We have evidence that all
the communications passing
- 213. between AT&T's network and other networks
in their Northern California facility
- 214. have been intercepted,
so that would necessarily include
- 215. the Internet communications of
our Northern California plaintiffs.
- 216. Okay, thank you.
- 217. Thank you, your honor.
- 218. May it please the Court,
- 219. I'm Thomas Byron from
the Department of Justice
- 220. here on behalf of
the Government defendants.
- 221. We think this litigation
need not be resolved in Federal Court.
- 222. In light of the oversight
of the political branches
- 223. both Legislative and Executive,
- 224. which provides a better opportunity
for oversight and resolution
- 225. of the concerns raised
concerning nationwide policies
- 226. of alleged surveillance
in these complaints.
- 227. Even if it's revealed
that one or more of the plaintiffs
- 228. had email or telephone conversations
intercepted that had nothing to do
- 229. with the national security?
- 230. Your honor, I don't know
that anyone necessarily
- 231. would have standing to raise
the particular claims that issue
- 232. in these 2 cases.
- 233. We think instead that the kinds of claims
that issue here against these defendants
- 234. are those that are
better suited to resolution
- 235. before the representative branches
of our government...
- 236. What role... would the Judiciary have
if your... approach is adopted...
- 237. Judge Peterson, I think the...
- 238. I mean, we just get out
of the way, is that it?
- 239. Well, Judge Peterson, what I think
is that there is a narrow category,
- 240. subset of cases in which
it may be appropriate
- 241. to step aside
for that narrow category of cases.
- 242. But mmm... the Judiciary plays a role...
- 243. To be sure, Judge Peterson...
- 244. in our system.
- 245. Yes Your Honor and we don't
mean to diminish that.
- 246. You're asking us to abdicate that role.
- 247. No, Your Honor,
- 248. but it is a question of this court's
discretion whether to reach that issue.
- 249. We do think that there is simply
no way for the litigation to proceed
- 250. without risk of divulging those very
questions of privileged information
- 251. that would cause,
as Director of National Intelligence
- 252. has explained,
- 253. exceptionally great damage to
National Security's disclose.
- 254. Thanks for having me.
- 255. Hum, if anybody has any questions,
like I said just...
- 256. Basically just raise your hand
and I'll try to call on you
- 257. as soon as I possibly can.
- 258. So, who here actually feels like
they are under surveillance,
- 259. pretty regularly?
- 260. Everyone inside of Occupy.
- 261. How many people here have been arrested
- 262. and at their Court date had
their phone taken into the back room?
- 263. How many people here
had their retina scanned?
- 264. Wow.
- 265. So you guys are actually, in a sense,
the canaries in the coal mine,
- 266. right,
- 267. because the incentives
are all lined up against you.
- 268. Anybody see how the subway link
your metro card to your debit card,
- 269. right? And, like, auto refill.
- 270. This is a concept which is key
to everything we'll talk about today.
- 271. And it's called linkability.
- 272. Take one piece of data
and link it to another piece of data.
- 273. So for example,
- 274. if you have your metro card
and you have your debit card,
- 275. you have those things
and you can draw a line between them right?
- 276. So that's, like, not a scary thing.
- 277. Except your bank card is tied to everything
else that you do during the day.
- 278. So now they know where you're going,
when you make purchases.
- 279. So when they decide to target you, they
can actually recreate your exact steps.
- 280. With a metro card and
with a credit card alone.
- 281. Like literally where you
go and what you buy
- 282. and potentially by linking
that data with other people
- 283. on similar travel plans,
- 284. they can figure out who you
talk to and who you met with.
- 285. When you then take cellphone data,
which logs your location
- 286. and you link up purchasing data,
metro card data and your debit card.
- 287. You start to get what you
could call metadata,
- 288. an aggregate over a person's life.
- 289. And metadata, an aggregate, is content.
- 290. It tells a story about you,
- 291. which is made up of facts,
but is not necessarily true.
- 292. So for example, just because
you were on the corner,
- 293. and all these data points point to it,
it doesn't mean you committed the crime.
- 294. So it's important to note
- 295. that if someone has a perception
of you having done a thing,
- 296. it will now follow you
for the rest of your life.
- 297. So just keep in mind that
what happens to you guys for example
- 298. with fingerprints, and retinal
scans, and photographs.
- 299. That is what is going to happen
to people in the future
- 300. when they resist policy changes
and when they try to protest
- 301. in a totally constitutionally
- 302. This is for you, Director Clapper,
again on the surveillance front.
- 303. And I hope we can do this
in just a yes or no answer,
- 304. because I know Senator
Feinstein wants to move on.
- 305. So, does the NSA collect
any type of data at all,
- 306. on millions or hundreds
of millions of Americans?
- 307. No sir.
- 308. It does not?
- 309. Not wittingly.
- 310. There are cases where
they could inadvertently,
- 311. perhaps, collect, but not wittingly.
- 312. Email from April 2013.
- 313. The encrypted archive
- 314. should be available to
you within seven days.
- 315. The key will follow when
everything else is done.
- 316. The material provided,
- 317. and investigative effort required
will be too much for any one person.
- 318. I recommend at a very minimum
you involve Glen Greenwald.
- 319. I believe you know him.
- 320. The plaintext of the payload
- 321. will include my true name details
for the record.
- 322. Though it will be your decision
- 323. as to whether or how
to declare my involvement.
- 324. My personal desire is that you
paint the target directly on my back.
- 325. No one, not even my most trusted confidant,
is aware of my intentions
- 326. and it would not be fair for them
to fall under suspicion for my actions.
- 327. You may be the only one
who can prevent that,
- 328. and that is by immediately
nailing me to the cross
- 329. rather than trying
to protect me as a source.
- 330. On timing, regarding
meeting up in Hong Kong,
- 331. the first rendezvous attempt
will be at 10 A.M. local time
- 332. on Monday.
- 333. We will meet in the hallway
outside of the restaurant
- 334. in the Mira Hotel.
- 335. I will be working on a Rubik's cube
- 336. so that you can identify me.
- 337. Approach me and ask if I know
the hours of the restaurant.
- 338. I'll respond by stating that I'm not sure
- 339. and suggest you try the lounge instead.
- 340. I'll offer to show you where it
is, and at that point we're good.
- 341. You simply need to follow naturally.
- 342. As far as positioning I mean
- 343. if you want us to sit in any
particular way or whatever.
- 344. You know, I'm gonna go there
just like we get better light.
- 345. There is, you know, so many different
- 346. enormous stories
- 347. just that are kind of standalone stories
- 348. that, even like you know certain
things on my individual document
- 349. that can just be their own story
- 350. and I just want to start
turning those stories out.
- 351. I basically woke up this morning and
I already started writing stories
- 352. hum so I'm hoping to, you know,
- 353. start publishing within
like a day or two days.
- 354. OK
- 355. It's as long as you're good with that.
- 356. Yeah
- 357. and so as far as I...
- 358. the stuff we have to talk about,
- 359. I mean I'm kind of like
- 360. dichotomizing it between,
- 361. you know, stuff that I'd like
to talk you about,
- 362. in terms of like the documents
and the content.
- 363. Laura has a bunch of questions
about that as well.
- 364. So while we're working through
the documents getting your take-on,
- 365. a lot of the stuff that, you know,
- 366. help me understand it better, but then
also the sort of You story, right...
- 367. like the who you are?
- 368. Yeah
- 369. what you've done, why you've
done what you've done.
- 370. Yeah
- 371. and I'd love to do that first.
- 372. OK
- 373. In part because, you are
the only one who can do that.
- 374. Yeah
- 375. so I'd like to just get it done
so let it's done,
- 376. and also because, you know,
it might be that you wanna do that early.
- 377. Yeah
- 378. because, it might be necessary,
we might choose to have that done early.
- 379. What are you... tell me your thoughts,
just where you are with that?
- 380. So primary one on that,
I think I've expressed it
- 381. a couple times online,
- 382. is I feel the modern media
has a big focus on personalities.
- 383. Totally.
- 384. And I'm a little concerned
the more we focus on that
- 385. the more they're going
to use that as a distraction.
- 386. I don't necessarily want that to happen, which
is why I've consistently said, you know,
- 387. I'm not the story here,
hum haha, nervous uh?
- 388. No it's a very very cheap pen, I
just, the slider is broke, go ahead.
- 389. Hum, but hum, yeah, anything I can do
to help you guys get this out,
- 390. I will do,
- 391. I don't have any experience
with media, with how this works
- 392. so I'm kind of learning as I go.
- 393. Right, so, I just want to get a sense of
why did you decide to do what you've done.
- 394. So for me it all comes down to
State Power against the people's ability
- 395. to meaningfully oppose that power.
- 396. And I'm sitting there everyday,
- 397. getting payed to design methods
to amplify that State Power.
- 398. And I'm realizing that if, you know,
the policy switches,
- 399. that there are the only things that
restrains these states, were changed,
- 400. there, you couldn't meaningfully
- 401. I mean, you have to be the most incredibly
sophisticated ta* col* actor in existence.
- 402. I'm not sure there's anybody,
no matter how gifted you are,
- 403. who could oppose all of the
offices and all the bright people
- 404. even all the mediocre people out there with all
of their tools and all of their capabilities.
- 405. And as I saw the promise
of the Obama administration
- 406. be betrayed and walk away from it.
In fact, actually advance
- 407. the things that had been promised
to be sort of curtailed and rained in
- 408. and dialed back.
- 409. It actually gets worse,
particularly drone strikes.
- 410. Which I also learned in NSA,
- 411. we could watch drone videos
from our desktops,
- 412. as I saw that, that really
hardened me to action.
- 413. In real time?
- 414. In real time, yeah,
- 415. it'll stream a lower quality
of the video to your desktop,
- 416. typically you'd be watching surveillance drones
as opposed to actually letting you know,
- 417. murder drones really going out there
and bomb somebody.
- 418. But you'll have a drone
that's just following somebody's house
- 419. for hours and hours.
- 420. And you won't know who
it is because, you know,
- 421. you don't have the context for that
but it's just a page
- 422. where it's lists
and lists of drone feeds
- 423. and all these different countries
with all these different code names
- 424. and you can just click
on which one you want to see.
- 425. Right, so if your self interest
is to live in a world in which
- 426. there's maximum privacy,
- 427. doing something that could
put you into prison,
- 428. in which your privacy is completely destroyed
is sort of the antithesis of that,
- 429. how did you reach the point where
that was a worthwhile calculation for you?
- 430. I remember what the Internet was like
before it was being watched.
- 431. And there has never been anything
in the history of man like it.
- 432. I mean you could have children
from one part of the world
- 433. having an equal discussion,
- 434. where you know they were sort of granted
- 435. the same respect
for their ideas and conversation,
- 436. with experts in the field
from another part of the world
- 437. on any topic, anywhere,
anytime, all the time.
- 438. And it was free and unrestrained.
- 439. And we've seen the chilling of that,
the cooling of that and the changing
- 440. of that model towards something
which people self police their own views.
- 441. And they literally make
their own jokes on ending up on the list
- 442. if they donate to a political cause
or if they say something in a discussion.
- 443. And it has become an expectation
that we're being watched.
- 444. Many people I've talked to have mentioned
that they're careful about what they type
- 445. into search engines.
- 446. Because they know that it's being recorded.
- 447. And that limits the boundaries
of their intellectual exploration.
- 448. And I'm more willing to risk
- 449. imprisonment
- 450. or any other negative outcome personally
- 451. than I am willing to risk
- 452. the curtailment of my intellectual freedom
- 453. and that of those around me,
- 454. whom I care for equally as I do for myself.
- 455. And again that's not to say
that I'm self sacrificing
- 456. because it gives me, I feel good,
- 457. in my human experience
- 458. to know that I can contribute
to the good of others.
- 459. Could you elaborate on that?
- 460. So, I don't know how much the programs
and the actual technical capacities
- 461. everybody's talked to you about
but there is an infrastructure in place
- 462. in the United States
and world wide that NSA has built
- 463. in cooperation with
other governments as well,
- 464. that intercepts
- 465. basically every
- 466. digital communication,
- 467. every radio communication,
- 468. every analog communication
- 469. that it has sensors in place to detect.
- 470. And with these capabilities,
- 471. basically the vast majority
- 472. of human
- 473. and computer to computer communications,
- 474. device-based communication,
- 475. which that sort of then forms
the relationships between humans,
- 476. are automatically ingested
- 477. And that allows individuals
- 478. search your communications
based on self certifications.
- 479. So for example, if I wanted
to see the content
- 480. of your email or,
- 481. you know, your wife's phone calls
- 482. or anything like that.
- 483. All I have to do is use
what's called a selector.
- 484. Any kind of thing
- 485. in the communication's chain
- 486. that might uniquely or almost uniquely
- 487. identify you as an individual.
- 488. And I'm talking about
things like email addresses,
- 489. IP addresses, phone numbers,
- 490. credit cards,
- 491. even passwords
- 492. that are unique to you,
that aren't used by anyone else.
- 493. I can input those into the system
- 494. and it will not only go
back through the database
- 495. and go
"have I seen this anywhere in the past?",
- 496. it will basically put an
additional level of scrutiny on it
- 497. moving into the future that says
- 498. "if this is detected now
or at anytime in the future,"
- 499. I want this to go to me immediately"
and alert me in real time
- 500. that you're communicating
- 501. things like that.
- 502. So I don't know who you are
or anything about you.
- 503. Ok. I work for Booz Allen Hamilton,
- 504. I am sort of on loan to NSA,
I don't talk to Booz Allen boss,
- 505. I don't get tasking from Booz Allen,
it's all from NSA.
- 506. So, I don't know your name.
- 507. Oh, sorry, my name is Edward Snowden,
- 508. I go by Ed.
- 509. Edward Joseph Snowden is the full name.
- 510. S. N. O. W. D. E. N...
- 511. And where are you from?
- 512. I'm originally...
I was born in North Carolina,
- 513. small town, Elizabeth City.
- 514. There is a Coast Guard station there,
- 515. I'm from a military family.
- 516. But I spent most of my time
growing up around Fort Meade in Maryland.
- 517. And your family,
what's the consequences for them?
- 518. This is actually
what has made this hardest.
- 519. My family doesn't know
what's happening, they're unaware.
- 520. I don't think I'll be able
to keep the family ties
- 521. that I've had for all my life
- 522. because of the risk of
associating them with this.
- 523. And I'll leave what to publish
and what not to publish to you guys,
- 524. I trust you'll be responsible on this. But
basically, the closer I stay to my family,
- 525. the more likely they are
to be leaned on.
- 526. So you don't want me to report this?
- 527. We dont have... I mean,
we definitely want to do
- 528. whatever we can not to
include them or bring them into the mix.
- 529. Oh I'm sorry that's fine, I won't...
- 530. I'm sorry I'm going to interrupt you.
- 531. Can we just stop for a second,
do the document and then go back to that?
- 532. What do I need? Do I need
an email address that we're using or...
- 533. Well you can send... Once you've encrypted it, you
can send it from whatever you think is appropriate.
- 534. The main thing is
you've got to encapsulate all of this
- 535. in a way that it can't be
decrypted and read
- 536. once it's in transit across the
network or on either of the end points.
- 537. Ok I mean just so you know
these documents are basically all going
- 538. to be uploaded within like 48 hours.
- 539. This is simply...
- 540. You want to get in the process
of doing this for everything because
- 541. it seems hard but it's not hard,
this is super easy.
- 542. Ok so just walk me through it.
- 543. Ok. Show me the actual folder structure
where these files are first.
- 544. How many documents
did you say there were?
- 545. Seven.
- 546. Ok well, while you're working...
- 547. Ok go ahead.
- 548. How many documents are we talking about?
- 549. Because in The Guardian,
- 550. that Wikileaks, technical people
- 551. set up a system
- 552. so that they were available
for anybody to see
- 553. and I just wonder if it's
possible to do the same thing.
- 554. That would be the ideal end game.
- 555. But because some of these documents
are legitimately classified
- 556. in ways that could cause harm
to people and methods.
- 557. I'm comfortable in my
technical ability to protect them.
- 558. I mean you could literally
shoot me or torture me
- 559. and I could not disclose
the password, if I wanted to.
- 560. I have the sophistication to do that.
- 561. There are some journalists
that I think could do that,
- 562. but there are a number
of them that couldn't.
- 563. But the question becomes,
- 564. can an organization
- 565. actually control that information
- 566. in that manner
- 567. without risking basically
an uncontrolled disclosure?
- 568. But I do agree with that, honestly
- 569. I don't want to be
the person making the decisions
- 570. on what should be public
and what shouldn't.
- 571. Which is why rather than
publishing these on my own,
- 572. or putting them out openly,
I'm running them through journalists.
- 573. So that my bias, and my things,
- 574. because clearly
I have some strongly held views,
- 575. are removed from that equation
- 576. and the public interest is being
represented in the most responsible manner.
- 577. Yeah.
- 578. Actually given your sort of...
- 579. with the U.K and whatnot.
- 580. I'd like to point out that
GCHQ has probably the most invasive...
- 581. I know - network intercept
program anywhere in the world.
- 582. It's called TEMPORA,
T. E. M. P. O. R. A.
- 583. And it's the world's first "full take",
they call it, and that means
- 584. content in addition to metadata
- 585. on everything.
- 586. So this is what I'd like to do
just in term of scheduling
- 587. if it's good with everybody else.
Are you feeling you're done?
- 588. Yeah yeah I'm done.
- 589. So, I'm anxious to go back,
- 590. get those articles done
- 591. and then there is a
bunch of documents
- 592. that aren't about those first two or three
stories that I'd like to spend time with you...
- 593. Sure yeah
- 594. kinda going over.
- 595. I'm not going anywhere.
- 596. You're available?
You want to check your book first?
- 597. Let me check my schedule.
- 598. Is that good for you Laura?
You want to...
- 599. - It's great.
- 600. Hello.
- 601. Yes.
- 602. My meal was great thank you very much.
- 603. No I still have some left and I think
I'm gonna be eating it later
- 604. so you can just leave me alone for now.
- 605. Ok great thank you so
much, have a good one bye.
- 606. Let's fix that real quick.
- 607. So another fun thing I was telling
Laura about this:
- 608. All these new VOIP phones
- 609. they have little computers in them
- 610. and you can hot mike these
over the network,
- 611. all the time even when
the receiver's down so...
- 612. as long as it's plugged in
- 613. it can be listening on.
- 614. And I haven't even considered
that earlier. But yeah...
- 615. OK.
- 616. There are so many ways...
This could be...
- 617. Everything that's in here
is pretty much gonna be
- 618. on the public record at some point.
- 619. We should operate on that.
- 620. Yeah. Yeah, I think...
I think we are...
- 621. So, do you have your
air gapped machine with you?
- 622. I do, I do.
- 623. Let me pop that out.
- 624. Do you have an
understanding or commitment on
- 625. when you guys are gonna
to press for the first stories?
- 626. It's very seven or eight
in the morning in London.
- 627. Uh uh, OK.
- 628. Oh, let's see here.
- 629. Ok, hey look there's another one.
- 630. Pro tip, let's not leave the same SD cards
in our laptops forever in the future.
- 631. Did you know this was still
kicking around in your laptop?
- 632. Yeah, I mean that was the... mmh...
- 633. OK, just to make it sure.
- 634. OK, yeah. This is it?
- 635. Yeah.
- 636. OK.
- 637. Right there.
- 638. Thanks. You will have a new one
who will look exactly identical
- 639. but it's a different archive.
So you might want to take.
- 640. Could you pass me my
magic mantle of power?
- 641. Uh uh...
- 642. Is that about possibility of overhead?
- 643. Visual. Yes, Visual collection.
- 644. I don't think at this point
there is anything in this regards
- 645. that would shock us.
- 646. We become pretty...
Ewen you once said before,
- 647. he's like, he's like:
I'm never leaving my room,
- 648. I'm never leaving anything
in my room again.
- 649. And the single machine...
I was like
- 650. you've been infected by the paranoia bug,
happens to all of us.
- 651. He was like... I would never
leave a single of these device,
- 652. and I would never leave my and again alone.
- 653. My bag's getting heavier and heavier.
- 654. Exactly.
- 655. Alright, I'm gonna need you to enter
- 656. your root password 'cause
I don't know what it is.
- 657. If you wanna use this
you're more than welcome, so uh ...
- 658. OK, looks like your root
password's not 4 caracters long anyway.
- 659. It's usually a lot longer but that's
just like a one time only thing, right?
- 660. So, it is uh...
- 661. It had been a lot longer but ever since I
knew is that it was a one time only session,
- 662. I've been making it shorter.
Is that not good?
- 663. It's actually not. I was expressing this
with Laura either.
- 664. The issue is because of the fact
it's got a hardware MAC address
- 665. and things like that,
- 666. and if people are able to identify
your machine and they're able to...
- 667. This is the fact you're about
to break the most upsetting story?
- 668. Yeah, that's true.
- 669. So they might kinda prioritize.
- 670. It's ten letters I type very quickly.
Actually it's ten letters but...
- 671. So ten letters would be good if they
had to bruteforce the entire key space.
- 672. That would still probably only take
a couple of days for NSA. Uh...
- 673. That's a fire alarm, OK...
- 674. hopefully this just sounds like
a 3 seconds test or is this...
- 675. Do you wanna to call the desk and ask?
- 676. Yeah, I don't think it's an issue,
but it's interesting that I just.
- 677. Did that happen before?
- 678. Maybe they got mad cause they couldn't
listen into us through the phone anymore.
- 679. Has the fire alarm gone off before?
- 680. No that's the first time that has happened. Let me...
so just in case they have like an alert.
- 681. We probably...
- 682. We might have to evacuate.
- 683. Should we ignore that, I don't know?
- 684. It's not continuous.
- 685. It's not continuous.
No, I'm just saying if it continues...
- 686. And then we come and
meet the guys down in the lobby.
- 687. Yeah, alright.
- 688. Yeah.
- 689. Yeah let's, let's leave for now
when we'll have finished this up.
- 690. Not that they're gonna answer 'cause
they probably have seven thousands calls.
- 691. Yeah.
- 692. Hi, we hear a loud buzzing
on the tenth flour.
- 693. Can you tell us what that is?
- 694. Ah, OK.
- 695. OK, great.
- 696. Thank you, bye.
- 697. Fire alarm testing, maintenance.
- 698. Yes. That's good,
that's what I wanted to hear.
- 699. Nice of them to...
Nice of them to let us know.
- 700. Uhm, I just wanna give you
kind of a quick tour, uh...
- 701. When Laura was looking at this
she was kind of salivating...
- 702. and couldn't stop like
actually reading these documents.
- 703. Right, right.
So we'll try and restrain ourselves
- 704. although I don't promise
that it will succeed.
- 705. I just wanna kinda explain
a brief overview
- 706. of what these are
and how they're organized.
- 707. On the beginning of
document of interest,
- 708. the primary purposes of the second archive
is to bring the focus over to.
- 709. SSO as opposed to PRISM.
- 710. This is in general.
SSO are the Special Source Operations.
- 711. This is the world wide
passive collection on networks
- 712. they're both domestic to the US
- 713. There's a lot of
different ways they do it
- 714. but, uh corporate partnerships
are one of the primary things,
- 715. they do domestically
they also do this for multinationals
- 716. that might be headquarted
in the US so they can kinda coerce
- 717. or just pay into giving them access.
- 718. And they also do bilaterally
with the assistance of certain governments.
- 719. And that's based on the
premise that they go.
- 720. "All right, we'll help you set the system
up if you give us all the data from it".
- 721. Hum, there's... there's a lot more here
- 722. than any one person
or probably one team could do.
- 723. Right.
- 724. Hum, XKEYSCORE Deep Dive.
- 725. XKEYSCORE in general, and there's
a huge folder of documentation
- 726. on XKEYSCORE and how it works,
- 727. is the front-end system
that analysts use
- 728. for querying that sort of ocean of raw
singing that I was telling you about.
- 729. All that stuff where you can sort of
do the retroactive searches,
- 730. live searches, get flagging, what not.
- 731. XKEYSCORE is the front-end for that.
- 732. I'm just gonna show you one slide here,
'cause Laura thought it was valuable
- 733. on this talk on kinda
how these capabilities ramp up
- 734. in sophistication over time.
- 735. This is kinda nice.
- 736. As of fiscal year 2011, they could monitor
- 737. 1 billion telephones and
internet sessions simultanously,
- 738. per one of these devices,
- 739. and they can collect at a rate
of 125 Gigabytes a second,
- 740. which is a Terabit per second.
- 741. That's for each one of these?
- 742. That's for each one of these, yeah.
- 743. How many TUMULT missions
would that be then?
- 744. Part of this, back then
there were 20 sites,
- 745. there's ten at DOD installations.
- 746. But these are all outdated,
we've expanded pretty rapidly.
- 747. But still 20 sites, that's
at least 20 billion.
- 748. This all need to get out.
You know what I mean, it's like...
- 749. Just in terms of understanding,
the capabilities, it's so opaque.
- 750. It's not science fiction.
This stuff is happening right now.
- 751. No, that's what I mean, it's like...
The magnitude of it,
- 752. and like this a pretty inaccessible
- 753. But, even this it's really chilling,
you know what I mean?
- 754. Yeah, I mean, we should be having debates
- 755. about whether we want Government
- 756. I mean this is massive and extraordinary.
- 757. Even though you know it...
Even though you know that...
- 758. to see it like the
physical blueprints of it
- 759. and sort of the technical
expressions of it,
- 760. brutally hits home like...
in a super visceral way that is so needed.
- 761. This is CNN Breaking news.
- 762. An explosive new report is
re-igniting the concerns
- 763. that your privacy is being violated
to protect America's "security".
- 764. It reveals a court order giving
the National Security Agency
- 765. blanket access to millions of
Verizon customer's records
- 766. on a daily basis.
- 767. Earlier I had the chance to
conduct the first TV interview
- 768. with the reporter
who broke this story wide open,
- 769. Glenn Greenwald, of The Guardian.
- 770. Congratulations on the scoop!
- 771. Explain for our viewers
why this is important?
- 772. It's important because
people have understood
- 773. that the law that this was done under,
which is the Patriot Act
- 774. enacted in the wake of 9/11.
- 775. Was a law that allowed the government
very broad powers to get records
- 776. about people with a lower level of suspicion
and probable cause to traditional standards.
- 777. So it has always been assumed
that under the Patriot Act,
- 778. if the government had even any suspicion
that you where involved
- 779. in a crime or terrorism, they could
get a lot of information about you.
- 780. What this court order does
that makes it so striking
- 781. is that it's not directed at any individuals
who they believe or have suspicion of
- 782. committing crime or a part of
a terrorist organization.
- 783. It's collecting the phone records of
every single customer of Verizon business
- 784. and finding out every single call that
they've made internationally and locally.
- 785. So it's indiscriminant and it's sweeping.
It's a Government program designed
- 786. to collect information about all Americans
- 787. not just people
where they believe there is reason to think
- 788. they've done anything wrong.
- 789. It's a tough situation.
- 790. You know hearing that
- 791. the person that you love
that you've spent the decade with
- 792. may not be coming back.
- 793. What did they ask her?
- 794. Hum... When was the last time she saw me?
- 795. Where am I?
- 796. What am I doing?
- 797. Hum... you know.
- 798. What does she know about my illness?
- 799. Things like that.
- 800. So yeah they're pretty solidly aware.
- 801. Cause she's...
- 802. I'm clearly not at home ill.
- 803. Hello, hello.
- 804. Hello, let me disconnect
from the Internet.
- 805. So there is some news?
- 806. Yes there was indeed some news.
- 807. I have config today, I think,
maybe just a few hours ago.
- 808. What kind of people does it...?
- 809. An HR lady I'm assuming from NSA
as opposed to Booz Allen.
- 810. Because she has was accompanied
by a police officer
- 811. which mean the NSA police
and they're planning to break into my house
- 812. which regular police don't do.
- 813. Does she lives there?
- 814. Yeah she lives there so I
told her to cooperate fully
- 815. I can't find my phone just one second.
- 816. And don't worry about herself.
- 817. You know what I gonna do,
I'll just take out the stuff I want to use.
- 818. OK
- 819. OK well look I mean this
is not a surprise at all.
- 820. Not yeah I know I planned for it but
it's just you know when it's impacting
- 821. and when they're talking to you
it's a little bit different.
- 822. Absolutely.
- 823. But it's possible that they just noticed
that you're missing
- 824. I guess it's not really possible.
- 825. It is but yeah they're I mean.
- 826. Hum... let me just get rid of this.
- 827. So I obviously was focused on other things
than appearance this morning.
- 828. How was she? How does she reacted?
Was she relatively calm about it?
- 829. She's relatively calm.
- 830. Does she know anything
about what you're doing?
- 831. She has, she has no idea
- 832. and that's I mean I feel badly about that
- 833. but that's the only way
I could think of where
- 834. like she can't be in trouble.
- 835. Did you just basically do a
"I have to go somewhere for reasons
- 836. "that I can't tell you
about" kind of thing?
- 837. I just disappeared
when she was on vacation
- 838. and I left a note saying.
- 839. "Hey I'm gonna be away
for a while for work"
- 840. which isn't unusual for me in my business.
- 841. Right
- 842. you know so.
- 843. OK so let me ask a couple
things just quickly.
- 844. Are they gonna be able to go into your
stuff and figure out what you took?
- 845. Hum in some kind of some sort of like
peripheral sense but not necessarily.
- 846. Yes because I cast such a wide net
- 847. I they do that the only thing they're gonna
do is they're gonna have a heart attack
- 848. because they're gonna go
"He had access to everything".
- 849. Yeah
- 850. and they not gonna know what
specifically has been done.
- 851. I think they're gonna start to
actually feel a little better
- 852. although they're not gonna be
wild about this in any case.
- 853. When they see that the stories
are kind of cleaving to a trend
- 854. you know it's not like.
- 855. "Here is the list of everybody
who works everywhere."
- 856. Right.
- 857. I also think you know there're gonna be
paranoid in the extreme
- 858. and assuming all kind of
worst case scenarios
- 859. which is gonna you know I think
- 860. make them react in ways that probably
aren't like gonna be particularly
- 861. rational on their part
- 862. but at the same time there's...
I do think they're limited
- 863. for the moment.
- 864. I agree and I mean,
I had kind of time to set a stage where
- 865. we all enjoy at least a minimum
level of protection you know
- 866. no matter who we are who's involved in this
you know you're either a journalist.
- 867. Right
- 868. or you're either out of jurisdiction
- 869. so we have some time to play this
before they can really get nasty.
- 870. I think it's over you know the weeks
when they have times to get lawyers,
- 871. really sort of go.
- 872. "This is a special situation how can
we interpret this to our advantage?"
- 873. like we seen them do this
all the time you know
- 874. whether it's drones or wiretapping
or whatever they'll go.
- 875. Well according to this law
from the 1840's you know.
- 876. Yeah yeah of course
- 877. we can apply x, y to the Authority.
- 878. But that takes time and
that takes agreement.
- 879. Yeah and also you know I mean I think
- 880. the more public we are out there
to like as journalists
- 881. and the more protection
it's gonna give as well.
- 882. Have you started to give thoughts
to when you're ready to come forward?
- 883. I'm ready whenever huh honestly
I think there is sort of an agreement
- 884. that it's not going to bias
the reporting process.
- 885. That's my primary concern at this point.
- 886. I don't want to get myself into the issue
before it's gonna happen anyway
- 887. and where it takes away
for the stories that are getting out.
- 888. We're talking about tens of millions
- 889. who weren't suspected of doing anything
- 890. who were surveilled in this way.
- 891. Thoughts for a moment, I want to
continue this conversation,
- 892. these are really important sensitive issues
- 893. and the public out there has the right
to know what's going on... Stand by...
- 894. This is CNN breaking news.
- 895. Another explosive article has just appeared
this time in the Washington Post
- 896. it's breaking news and it reveals another broad
and secret US government surveillance program.
- 897. The Washington Post and The Guardian in
London reporting that the NSA and the FBI
- 898. are tapping directly into the central
servers of nine leading Internet companies
- 899. including Microsoft, Yahoo, Google,
Facebook, AOL, Skype, YouTube and Apple.
- 900. Reports says they're extracting audio,
video, photographs, e-mails, documents
- 901. and connection logs that enable analysts to track
a person's movements and context over time.
- 902. Let's discuss this latest revelation
that coming out fast,
- 903. Bill Binney, the formal official of the NSA
- 904. who quit back in 2001, you were angry about
what was going on
- 905. you've been known as
a whistleblower right now.
- 906. - Bill, what do you think about
this Washington Post story?
- 907. - Well, I assume it's just the continuation
of what they've been doing all along.
- 908. - So you're not surprised?
- 909. - No.
- 910. - Do you have any idea who's
leaking this information?
- 911. - I don't know who leaked this,
- 912. I have no doubt that the administration
will launch an investigation
- 913. not into who approved these programs
but into who leaked the information.
- 914. I'm not shocked they come to
denying it, I don't assume that...
- 915. Do you believe it?
- 916. - There're maybe some technical basis
on which they can say that we are not
- 917. actively collaborating or they don't have
what we consider in our definition
- 918. to be direct access to our servers
but what I do know is that I've talked to
- 919. more that one person
- 920. who has sat at a desk at a web portal
and typed out commands
- 921. and reached into those servers
from a distance.
- 922. So, whatever they want to call that,
that's what's happening.
- 923. Hold on, what are we calling the single biggest
infringement on American civil liberties
- 924. probably of all time, isn't it?
- 925. - ... we already have the New York Times now today saying
that the Administration has lost all credibility.
- 926. - The New York Times slammed
President Obama for this
- 927. and frankly I was used to that
- 928. the New York Times used to slam George Bush for
protecting the country for the steps he took.
- 929. I don't want us to drop our guard.
- 930. I don't want us to be struck
again as we saw in Boston,
- 931. I understand,
- 932. people are willing to sacrifice their civil liberties,
people are sheltered inside which is enough...
- 933. How can you believe
in freedom, do you see?
- 934. I mean try and play the devil's advocate
for me, when you have secret courts,
- 935. secret operations like PRISM,
secret investigations which go into
- 936. every spit and cough of every American's lives
without any Member of the American public
- 937. knowing about it. That's not freedom is it?
- 938. - In 2008, they eliminated the
warrant requirement for all conversations
- 939. except ones that takes place
by and among Americans
- 940. exclusively on America's soil.
- 941. So they don't need warrants now for people
who are foreigners
- 942. outside of the US but they also don't need
warrants for Americans
- 943. who are in the United States
communicating with people
- 944. reasonably believed to be
outside of the US.
- 945. So again, the fact that there are no checks, no
oversight about who's looking over the NSA's shoulder,
- 946. means that they can take whatever they want
and the fact that it's all behind a wall
- 947. of secrecy and they threaten people
who want to expose it
- 948. means that whatever they're doing
even violating the law
- 949. is something we're unlikely to know
until we start having real investigations
- 950. and real transparency into
what it is the government is doing.
- 951. Glenn Greenwald, congratulations again
on exposing what is a true scandal,
- 952. I appreciate you joining me.
- 953. Hey I just heard from Lindsay and huh...
she's still alive, which is good and free.
- 954. My rent checks apparently are no longer
getting through to my landlord
- 955. so they said if we don't pay them
in five days we will be evicted,
- 956. which is strange because I got a system
set up that automatically pays them.
- 957. So there is that apparently there is
construction trucks all over the street
- 958. of my house, so that's, I wonder
what they're looking for.
- 959. It is... It is an unusual feeling
that's kind of hard to...
- 960. hard to like, describe or convey in words
but not knowing what's gonna happen
- 961. in the next days, the next hour
or the next week
- 962. it's scary but at the same time
it's liberating, you know,
- 963. the planning comes a lot easier
because you don't have
- 964. that many variables to take into plate,
you can only act, and then act again.
- 965. Now all these phone calls
are being recorded digitally
- 966. not for content but
for origin and destination
- 967. now word the government is going right into the
servers of these large Internet companies.
- 968. How does the government politically speaking
make the argument that this is essential
- 969. to National Security and not
a dramatic overreach
- 970. in terms of personal privacy?
- 971. It's difficult Matt, because
as Peter was pointing out, overnight
- 972. we had an extraordinary late night
close to midnight announcement
- 973. and a declassification from the
Director of National Intelligence.
- 974. They are scrambling, the Administration is
already supported strongly by leaders
- 975. in both parties from the
- 976. GCHQ has an internal Wikipedia at the top
secret you know, super classified level
- 977. where anybody working intelligence
can work on anything they want.
- 978. That's what this is, I'm giving it to you, you can make
the decision on that what's appropriate what's not.
- 979. Hum it's gonna be documents of,
you know, different types,
- 980. pictures and Power Points and Word documents.
Stuff like that...
- 981. Sorry can I take that seat?
- 982. Yeah.
- 983. Sorry, I'm sorry I've got used to repeat,
so in these documents, they will show...
- 984. Yeah there will be
a couple more documents on that,
- 985. that's only one part though,
like it talks about Tempora
- 986. and a little more thing
that's the wiki article itself.
- 987. It was also talking about a self-developed tool
called UDAQ U.D.A.Q. it's their search tool
- 988. for all the stuff they collect
was what it looked like.
- 989. Yeah.
- 990. Hum it's gonna be projects,
it's gonna be troubleshooting pages
- 991. for a particular tool.
- 992. Thanks.
- 993. And, the next step,
when do you think you'll go public?
- 994. Arh... I think it's pretty soon, I mean, with
the reaction, this escalated more quickly,
- 995. I think pretty much as soon as they
start trying to make this about me
- 996. which should be any day now.
- 997. Yeah.
- 998. Hum I'll come out just to go hey,
you know, this is not a question of
- 999. somebody skulking around in the shadows.
These are public issues,
- 1000. these are not my issues
you know these are everybody's issues,
- 1001. I'm not afraid of you, you know,
you're not gonna bully me in the silence
- 1002. like you've done to everybody else
- 1003. and if no body else is gonna do it I will
- 1004. and hopefully when I'm gone
whatever you do to me,
- 1005. there will be somebody else
who will do the same thing.
- 1006. It will be the sort of Internet principle
you know, of the Hydra:
- 1007. You can stop one person
but there is gonna be seven more of us.
- 1008. Yeah.
- 1009. Are you getting more nervous?
- 1010. I mean... no. I think the way
I look at stress... particularly because
- 1011. I sort of knew this was coming... because
I sort of volunteered to walk into it.
- 1012. I'm already sort of familiar with the idea.
- 1013. I'm not worried about it.
- 1014. When somebody like
busts in the door suddenly
- 1015. I'll get nervous and it'll affect me
but until they do, you know...
- 1016. Yeah, yeah.
- 1017. But until they do umm... you know.
- 1018. I'm eating a little less
that's the only difference I think.
- 1019. Let's talk about the issue with
when we're gonna say who you are.
- 1020. Yeah.
- 1021. This is, you know, you have to talk me through
this because I have a big worry about this.
- 1022. OK tell me.
- 1023. Which is that...
if we come out and
- 1024. I know that you believe
that your detection is inevitable
- 1025. and that it's inevitable imminently.
- 1026. There is, you know, in the New York Times
today Charlie Savage the fascinating.
- 1027. Sherlock Holmes of political
reporting deduced that
- 1028. the fact that there has been
these leaks in succession
- 1029. probably means that there's some one person
that decided to leak...
- 1030. Somebody else quoted you saying
it was one of your readers.
- 1031. Yeah.
- 1032. And somebody else is putting on things.
- 1033. Yeah so you know, I mean it's fine
I want people to, I wanted to be like.
- 1034. Yeah.
- 1035. You know like this is a person,
I want to start introducing the concept of
- 1036. this is a person who has a particular set
of political objectives
- 1037. about informing the world about
what's taking place.
- 1038. Like you know,
I'm keeping it all anonymous totally
- 1039. but I want to start introducing you
in that kind of incremental way.
- 1040. But here's the thing.
- 1041. What I'm concerned about it
that if come out and say
- 1042. here's who this is, here's what he did
the whole thing
- 1043. that we talked about.
- 1044. Then we're gonna basically be doing
the government's work for them
- 1045. and we're gonna basically be handing them
you know a confession
- 1046. and helping them identify who find it.
- 1047. I mean maybe you're right,
maybe they'll find out quickly
- 1048. and maybe they'll know but is there
any possible idea that they won't?
- 1049. Are we kind of giving them stuff
that we don't...? Or...
- 1050. It's possible that they already know
but they don't want to reveal
- 1051. it because they don't know...
- 1052. Or that they don't know
and we're gonna be telling them like
- 1053. is it a possibility that they're gonna
need like 23 months or uncertainty
- 1054. and we're gonna be
solving their problem for them?
- 1055. Or let me just say the or part
maybe it doesn't matter to you,
- 1056. maybe you want it, maybe, I mean,
- 1057. you're not coming out because
- 1058. you think inevitably
they're gonna catch you
- 1059. and you want to do it first,
- 1060. you're coming out because
you want to fucking come out and...
- 1061. Oh there is that,
I mean that's the thing,
- 1062. I don't want to hide on this
and skulk around,
- 1063. I don't think I should have to
- 1064. obviously there is circumstances
that are saying that.
- 1065. I think it is powerful
to come out and be like
- 1066. look I'm not afraid and I don't think
other people should either,
- 1067. you know, I was sitting
in the office right next to you last week,
- 1068. we all have a stake in this,
this is our country
- 1069. and the balance of power
between the citizenry and the government
- 1070. is becoming that
of the ruling and the ruled
- 1071. as opposed to actually, you know,
the elected and the electorate.
- 1072. OK so that's what I need to hear,
that this is not about...
- 1073. But I do want to say,
I don't think there is a case
- 1074. that I'm not gonna be discovered,
in the fullness of time.
- 1075. It's just a question of time for me.
- 1076. You're right, it could take them
a long time, I don't think it will
- 1077. but I didn't try to hide the footprint
because again I intended to come forward.
- 1078. OK I'm gonna post this morning
just a general defense of whistleblowers
- 1079. and you in particular
without saying anything about you.
- 1080. I'm gonna go post
that right when I get back
- 1081. and I'm also doing like a big fuck you
to all the people who keep like talking
- 1082. about investigations like that.
I want that to be like...
- 1083. the fearlessness and the fuck you to like
the bullying tactics,
- 1084. has go to be completely preventing
every thing we do.
- 1085. I think that's brilliant.
I mean your principles on this I love,
- 1086. I can't support them enough because it is,
it's inverting the model
- 1087. of the government has laid out
where people where trying to,
- 1088. you know, say the truth, skulk around,
and then hide in the dark,
- 1089. and then quote anonymously.
I say yes, fuck that, let's just...
- 1090. OK, so here is the plan then,
I mean, and this is a thing, it's like
- 1091. once, I think we all just felt the fact
that this is the right way to do it.
- 1092. You feel the power of your choice,
you know what I mean,
- 1093. it's like I want that power
to be felt in the world.
- 1094. OK
- 1095. And it is the...
it's the ultimate standing up to them
- 1096. right like I'm not gonna fucking hide
even for one second,
- 1097. I'm gonna get right in your face,
- 1098. you don't have to investigate,
there's nothing to investigate,
- 1099. here I am!
- 1100. You know, and I think that
is just incredibly powerful,
- 1101. and then the question just becomes
- 1102. how do we do this in the right,
you know the perfect way,
- 1103. that's my burden and
that's what I'm gonna spend...
- 1104. So today it's gonna be
this story in the morning,
- 1105. assuming that
it doesn't change in The Guardian,
- 1106. it's gonna be this story in the morning,
- 1107. just to keep the mental going,
just to keep like the disclosures coming.
- 1108. A big one at night, now it's becoming like.
- 1109. "OK, this is a major leak"
- 1110. and after today when we post
the two stuff things that we're gonna post.
- 1111. It's gonna be "what the fuck
is this leak and who did it?"
- 1112. I guarantee you.
- 1113. I just want to make sure,
move over slightly...
- 1114. Do you want me to move
a little move over...
- 1115. I just wanna move... all right.
- 1116. OK
- 1117. We are ready.
- 1118. So let's us begin with some basic
- 1119. background information like
- 1120. just state your name,
- 1121. what position you held
in intelligence community
- 1122. and how long you worked
within that community.
- 1123. OK, uh... just some...
how are we going, like,
- 1124. in depth or
are we going like in general,
- 1125. like I'm currently
an infrastructure analyst, you know,
- 1126. Booz Allen Hamilton,
not going through my whole back story.
- 1127. Yes.
- 1128. OK,
- 1129. Just like summary kind of.
- 1130. OK
- 1131. My Name is Ed Snowden,
I'm 29 years old,
- 1132. I work for Booz Allen Hamilton
as an infrastructure analyst
- 1133. for NSA in Hawaii.
- 1134. And what are some of the positions
that you held previously
- 1135. within the intelligence community?
- 1136. I've been a system engineer,
system administrator, uh...
- 1137. senior advisor, uh...
for the, Central Intelligence Agency,
- 1138. solutions consultant and a
- 1139. systems officer.
- 1140. And what kind of clearances have...
have you held,
- 1141. what kinda classification?
- 1142. Uh... Top secret,
- 1143. So, people in my levels of access
for systems administration
- 1144. or as a infrastructure analyst
typically have higher accesses
- 1145. than an NSA employee would normally have.
- 1146. Normal NSA employees have a
combination of clearances called.
- 1147. TS SI TK and Gamma.
- 1148. Uh, that's a Top Secret Signals
Intelligence Talent Keyhole
- 1149. and Gamma.
- 1150. And they all relate to certain things
that are sort of core to the NSA mission.
- 1151. As a systems administrator
you get a special clearance
- 1152. called PrivAcc
for Privileged Access,
- 1153. which allows you to be exposed
to informations of any classification
- 1154. regardless of what
your position actually needs.
- 1155. Monday.
- 1156. June 10, 2013.
- 1157. Just before we go,
a remind of our top story,
- 1158. and that's the full map,
CIA typically worked at Edward Snowden
- 1159. says he's responsible for leaking information
that US authorities have been monitoring
- 1160. phone and Internet data.
- 1161. The US justice deparment confirmed
it is the first stages
- 1162. of a criminal investigation.
- 1163. Leave it long or got it shorter,
what do you think?
- 1164. As far as the video the people saw.
Am I less identifiable now?
- 1165. Lose it?
- 1166. Lose it? Cause I can't go all the way
down, it's still gonna be stubble.
- 1167. I don't have the blade for closer.
- 1168. Will you be talking
to any other media about this story today?
- 1169. I am.
- 1170. Uh, will you be coming to our office
- 1171. about where is Snowden
now, what his plans are?
- 1172. No, I won't talk about that,
so unless you have any other questions...
- 1173. OK
- 1174. What are you plans please?
Are you staying in Hong Kong
- 1175. for a the time being?
- 1176. For a little while.
- 1177. And do you have any hopes
to write more about this story
- 1178. or are you stopping
new writing about this story?
- 1179. No, I'm gonna continue
to write about it.
- 1180. Have you had any pressure
from the US Authorities
- 1181. about continuing to report on this?
- 1182. No.
- 1183. And have you heard anything about
what could be...
- 1184. asked you the Hong Kong Authorities
towards this case,
- 1185. whether they contacted you or asked you
anything about the whereabouts of Snowden
- 1186. and whether that's just another...
- 1187. I haven't heard about
the Authorities of any Government.
- 1188. And do, where do you think
this story is going then?
- 1189. For you and of course for Snowden
and of course for the US media
- 1190. and the US Administration in general?
- 1191. Uh, for me, I'm gonna continue to report.
- 1192. Reporting on what the Government has been doing
and what I think people should know about.
- 1193. As for him I don't think anyone knows
- 1194. people come after me or any of their third partners you
know they work closely with a number of other nations
- 1195. or you know they could pay off the trial
you know any of their agents are assets...
- 1196. A criminal investigation the whistleblower...
monitoring phone calls and Internet data goes public...
- 1197. Security forces in Afghanistan
say a number of...
- 1198. Now it's time for our news paper review
and looking at what's making headlines
- 1199. around the world.
- 1200. Let's start with The Guardian our top story which is
revealing the identity of the former CIA employee.
- 1201. The paper says he leaks information exposing the
scale of American's surveillance of the Internet.
- 1202. Edward Snowden,
what a great story...
- 1203. Well I think it's a fantastic story this could
be straight out from a John Le Carré novel
- 1204. I mean when you read what he did,
yes he got the material,
- 1205. he then decided to go to a place he identified
to be very difficult for America to get at him.
- 1206. God dammit
- 1207. which is Hong Kong because of course technically
inside China, the one country two systems policy
- 1208. there meaning he would get
potentially some protection,
- 1209. he thought, all very well planned,
could be just out of a spy novel.
- 1210. But what about the details.
- 1211. That could make it worse.
But just the lower half of my face.
- 1212. Snowden says he'd become increasingly
dismay by what he saw as the growing power
- 1213. of the NSA.
- 1214. And it's his decision to pass on
documents which is said to reveal
- 1215. the organisation monitored
millions of phone calls
- 1216. but that it had direct access
to some of the...
- 1217. How do you feel?
- 1218. Internet companies in the world.
- 1219. Uuh what happens, happens.
We've uh we've talked about this
- 1220. I knew what the risks and if I
get arrested, I get arrested,
- 1221. we were able to get the information
that needed to get out, out.
- 1222. And you and Glenn are able to keep
reporting regardless what happens to me.
- 1223. Now 29 year old Edward Snowden says that US intelligence
agencies gathered millions of phone records
- 1224. and monitored Internet data...
- 1225. Yes. I'm sorry who's asking?
- 1226. I'm afraid you have the wrong room thank you.
Wall Street Journal.
- 1227. Yes. I'm sorry say again?
- 1228. Uh, no thank you. No calls.
- 1229. I think they have the wrong number.
- 1230. Yeah, no calls. Thank you.
- 1231. Uh wait I'm sorry if it's two men from the
front desk they can call but no outside calls.
- 1232. Wait actually just... let them through.
Wait, wait m'am?
- 1233. Fuck.
- 1234. Yes. Wait is it a lawyer?
Yeah, no no no I mean,
- 1235. the people who are asking. Ask
them if they are lawyers.
- 1236. No tell her that she has the wrong number
and there is no Mr. Snowden here.
- 1237. Would you mind to talk in speakerphone?
- 1238. Sorry.
- 1239. Hi. I'm the client.
- 1240. Pretty good. I'm doing well.
- 1241. Ok.
- 1242. Ok.
- 1243. Ok, that's great. Is it OK if I bring equipment? Because
I'm just kind of going, so I can leave in any direction,
- 1244. at any time, and not come back.
- 1245. Ok, that sounds good.
- 1246. Thank you, thank you
so much for helping us.
- 1247. Yeah... And so, is there a precedent for
this where Hong Kong would extradite someone
- 1248. for political speech?
- 1249. "The President surely does not welcome
the way that this debate"
- 1250. has earned a greater attention
the last week,
- 1251. the leaked classified information about
sensitive programs that are
- 1252. important in our
fight against terrorists
- 1253. who would do harm
to Americans is a problem,
- 1254. but the debate itself is legitimate
and should be engaged.
- 1255. Right, so which one do we want here then.
- 1256. This is operational stuff,
so we mustn't say any of this.
- 1257. So redact that.
- 1258. Go near the top.
- 1259. What about the Alexander's quote,
is that something...
- 1260. Yeah. That's in TARMAC. "Why can't we
collect all the signals all the times?"
- 1261. Sounds like a good
summer homework project for Menwith".
- 1262. Keith Alexander the head of the NSA
on a visit to the UK. This one.
- 1263. Yeah.
- 1264. Yeah. It's a secret document
in that secret document.
- 1265. We've got a stick here that should
just have three single slides on it.
- 1266. If it's got more than three single slides,
we have to be extremely careful.
- 1267. Yeah?
- 1268. Yeah, that's it.
- 1269. This is really dangerous
stuff for us, Guardian.
- 1270. If we make mistakes, very angry.
- 1271. We kept it all under lock and key
and no one knows. No, I'm not saying that.
- 1272. OK
- 1273. They will come in and snap the front
door down if we elaborate on that...
- 1274. And he said...
- 1275. The Prime Minister is extremely
concerned about this.
- 1276. And they kept saying, "this
is from the very top."
- 1277. As you can see on this map the flight
that probably has Snowden aboard,
- 1278. has almost reached its destination here
in Moscow's scheduled plan,
- 1279. in the Russian capital within minutes...
- 1280. As you may have heard, there is a CIA agent
who has revealed a lot of information
- 1281. and he is now trapped in the
- 1282. airport in Moscow.
- 1283. We managed to get him out of Hong Kong,
- 1284. but when he landed in the Moscow airport,
- 1285. the American government had
canceled his passport.
- 1286. So formally he hasn't entered
into Russian territory,
- 1287. he is in the transit area of the airport.
- 1288. And one of our people is accompanying him.
- 1289. We are trying to arrange a private jet
- 1290. to take him from Moscow
- 1291. to Ecuador or perhaps maybe Venezuela
- 1292. or maybe Iceland,
- 1293. countries where he would be safe.
- 1294. May I collect all the phones please?
- 1295. I have everything in here.
- 1296. Put them in the refrigerator.
- 1297. So, as you know, in June,
- 1298. Snowden was in charge with 3
- 1299. legal violations felonies.
- 1300. Principaly under a World War I era
- 1301. criminal law called the Espionage Act.
- 1302. The Espionage Act is an extremely broad
- 1303. criminal prohibition against
- 1304. the sharing or dissemination
- 1305. of what's called
"National Defense information"
- 1306. it was only used to
- 1307. prosecute people who had been accused of
- 1308. acting with a foreign power,
spies not whistleblowers
- 1309. and it's a very unusual legal
representation I think
- 1310. not just for all of you,
but for me as well.
- 1311. The Espionage Act has not
- 1312. leaks to the press
and the public interest,
- 1313. and selling secrets to foreign enemies
- 1314. for personal profit.
- 1315. So, under the Espionage Act
- 1316. it's not a defense if the
information that was disclosed
- 1317. should not have been withheld
in the first place,
- 1318. that it was improperly classified.
- 1319. It's not a defense if the
dissemination was in the public interest
- 1320. that it led to reforms.
- 1321. Even if the court determines
that the programs that were revealed
- 1322. were illegal or unconstitutional.
- 1323. That's still not a defense
under the Espionage Act,
- 1324. the Government doesn't have
to defend the classification,
- 1325. it doesn't have to demonstrate
harm from the release,
- 1326. All this is irrelevant.
- 1327. So when we say that
the trial wouldn't be fair,
- 1328. we are not talking about
what human rights lawyers think
- 1329. of this fair trial practices.
- 1330. We are saying the law, the statute itself,
- 1331. eliminates any kind of defense
- 1332. that Snowden might be able to make
- 1333. and essentially will equate him with a spy.
- 1334. And of course those three counts could be
increased to a hundreed or two hundreed
- 1335. or three hundreed, they
could charge him separately
- 1336. for each document that has been
published by a journalist.
- 1337. And I think that we all recognize,
even though we sit here as lawyers
- 1338. in a lawyer's meeting
- 1339. that it's propably
95% politics and 5% law.
- 1340. How this would be resolved.
- 1341. "Mr. Snowden has been charged
with very serious crimes"
- 1342. and he should be returned to the United States
where he would be granted full due process
- 1343. and every right available to him
as a United States citizen.
- 1344. "Facing our justice system
under the Constitution."
- 1345. No, I don't think
Mr. Snowden was a Patriot.
- 1346. I called for a federal review
- 1347. of our surveillance operations
- 1348. before Mr. Snowden made these leaks.
- 1349. My preference,
- 1350. and I think the American
- 1351. would have been for a lawful, orderly
- 1352. examination of these laws.
- 1353. A thoughtful, fact based debate,
- 1354. that would then lead us to a better place.
- 1355. Oh my God. David. Hello my baby.
- 1356. I'm OK.
- 1357. You're OK?
- 1358. I just wanna go home.
- 1359. OK, OK OK. You just have to walk...
- 1360. How are you?
- 1361. Good, good. I'm totally fine, I
didn't sleep at all, I couldn't sleep.
- 1362. I know.
- 1363. "Brazil Demands Explanation
from UK Government."
- 1364. Recent reports have revealed that the NSA
have access to encryption keys
- 1365. and they paid tech companies to introduce
backdoors in encryption protocols.
- 1366. So we are going to talk about ways in which
we can defend ourselves against
- 1367. governments spying on us.
- 1368. So Mr. Jacob Appelbaum, as an encryption
and security software developper,
- 1369. and journalist.
- 1370. Ladar Levison, the founder of the
encrypted email service.
- 1371. Lavabit
- 1372. used by Edward Snowden.
- 1373. You have the floor.
- 1374. Thank you.
- 1375. Lavabit is an email service
that hopefully one day
- 1376. will be able to stand on its own
without any references to Snowden.
- 1377. My service was designed to remove me
- 1378. from the possibility of being forced
- 1379. to violate a person's privacy.
- 1380. Quite simply.
- 1381. Lavabit was designed to
remove the service provider
- 1382. from the equation,
- 1383. by not having logs on my server
- 1384. and not having access to
a person's emails on disk,
- 1385. I wasn't elimitating
- 1386. the possibility of surveillance,
- 1387. I was simply removing myself
from that equation.
- 1388. And that surveillance
would have to be conducted
- 1389. on the target
- 1390. either the sender
- 1391. or the receiver of the messages.
- 1392. But I was approached
by the FBI quite recently,
- 1393. and told
- 1394. that because I couldn't
turn over the information
- 1395. from that one particular user,
- 1396. I would be forced to
give up those SSL keys
- 1397. and let the FBI
collect every communication
- 1398. on my network without
any kind of transparency.
- 1399. And of course,
- 1400. I wasn't comfortable with that,
- 1401. to say the least!
- 1402. More disturbing was the fact that I couldn't
even tell anybody that it was going on.
- 1403. So I decided:
- 1404. "If I didn't win the
fight to unseal my case,"
- 1405. if I didn't win the battle
- 1406. to be able to tell people
what was going on,
- 1407. then my only ethical choice left
was to shutdown...
- 1408. Think about that.
- 1409. I believe in the rule of law, I believe
in the need to conduct investigations,
- 1410. but those investigations
are supposed to be difficult for a reason.
- 1411. It's supposed to be difficult
to invade somebody's privacy.
- 1412. Because of how intrusive it is,
- 1413. because of how disruptive it is.
- 1414. If we can't, if we don't have
a right to privacy,
- 1415. how do we have
a free and open discussion?
- 1416. What good is the right
to free speech,
- 1417. if it's not protected,
- 1418. in a sense that you can't have
a private discussion
- 1419. with somebody else
about something you disagree with.
- 1420. Think about the chilling effect
that that has.
- 1421. Think about the chilling effect
it does have
- 1422. on countries that don't have
a right to privacy.
- 1423. I've noticed a really interesting
- 1424. which is that what people used to call
liberty and freedom
- 1425. we now call privacy.
- 1426. And we say in the same breath
- 1427. that privacy is dead.
- 1428. This is something
that really concerns me
- 1429. about my generation
- 1430. especially when we talk about
how we're not surprised by anything.
- 1431. I think that we should consider that
- 1432. when we lose privacy we lose agency,
- 1433. we lose liberty itself
- 1434. because we no longer feel free
to express what we think.
- 1435. There is this myth of
the passive surveillance machine
- 1436. but actually what is surveillance
- 1437. This notion that the NSA are passive
- 1438. this is nonsense
- 1439. what we see is that they actively attack.
- 1440. European citizens, American citizens and,
- 1441. in fact, anyone that they can
- 1442. if they perceive an advantage.
- 1443. OK. Right.
- 1444. I have to give that in testimony.
- 1445. What are you going to tell?
- 1446. Everything I can truthfully.
- 1447. What will you talk about?
- 1448. Uh, whatever the questions they ask me.
- 1449. Yeah I think it's over there.
- 1450. Ok, it's alright. Thank you.
- 1451. Hey, how are you?
- 1452. Good.
- 1453. How are you?
- 1454. Good to see you again.
- 1455. Nice to meet you again, yes.
- 1456. Yeah.
- 1457. What do you think they're doing to reporters,
those of us that are working directly with...
- 1458. Snowden documents?
- 1459. How do you think they would approach
dealing with people like us?
- 1460. You're... You're on a
cast iron cover list.
- 1461. Which means any electronic device you use
- 1462. that they can attach to you
they all record and capture all that data.
- 1463. And what do they do with that data? They're
just trying to figure out what we're doing?
- 1464. Uh, well the primary...
- 1465. That's part of it. But the
other part, primarily part,
- 1466. is for them. I think it's to find the
sources of information you're getting.
- 1467. So if I have a confidential source who's
giving me information as a whistleblower,
- 1468. and he works within the US Government,
and he's concerned about
- 1469. what he perceives as
violation of the Constitution,
- 1470. uhm... and he gets in touch with me,
- 1471. Yeah...
- 1472. Go ahead. Yeah.
- 1473. Yeah. From there on, they would nail him
and start watching everything he did.
- 1474. And if you start passing data,
I'm sure they'd take him off the street.
- 1475. I mean, the way you have to do it
is like Deep Throat did, right?
- 1476. In the Nixon years,
meet in a basement of a parking garage...
- 1477. physically.
- 1478. Let's disassociate our
metadata one last time.
- 1479. So we don't have a clear record of your
true name in our final communication chain.
- 1480. This is obviously not to say
you can't claim your involvement,
- 1481. but as every trick in the book
is likely to be used and looking into this,
- 1482. I believe it's better,
that that particular disclosure
- 1483. come on your own terms.
- 1484. Thank you again for all you've done.
- 1485. So sorry again for the multiple delays.
- 1486. But we've been entering a territory
- 1487. with no model to benefit from.
- 1488. If all ends well,
- 1489. perhaps the demonstration
that our mess has worked
- 1490. would embolden more to come forward.
- 1491. Citizen.
- 1492. So the update that I want
to give you is about the new,
- 1493. uh... the new source that, that we...
- 1494. OK.
- 1495. That... uh, this is what...
this is the...
- 1496. you know this is the person who is doing
the... the most of the...
- 1497. Right, right, right.
- 1498. The work on it, uh...
And now... and now,
- 1499. what basically, what happens is...
- 1500. and...
- 1501. That's actually...
That's really dangerous...
- 1502. uh, on the source's side.
- 1503. Do they know how to
take care of themselves...
- 1504. Well he knows...
- 1505. or do you know anything about...
- 1506. he means it's, uh...
- 1507. It's all being done...
- 1508. OK.
- 1509. And they're all talking this way...
- 1510. OK.
- 1511. And, uh...
- 1512. I was gonna say
one of the big questions there is:
- 1513. Can they handle it?
You know with...
- 1514. Yeah, they're very careful...
- 1515. even they're through that.
- 1516. OK
- 1517. Yeah.
- 1518. And...
- 1519. That's what that is.
- 1520. Wow, that's really something.
- 1521. Oh, oh...
- 1522. Did you know that?
- 1523. One key thing: ALL drone strikes are done through
Ramstein Air Base in Germany - German govt has always.
- 1524. It's not the actual plan.
- 1525. Right, right right. You mean the control.
- 1526. It's the process, who's sending the...
- 1527. Yeah.
- 1528. There's a... There's a chart.
You know, it goes like a whole layout in it
- 1529. for everyone and it's...
- 1530. Yeah. It's really bold,
but it's really risky.
- 1531. But you know that... that's the thing if...
- 1532. There's more...
- 1533. if they understand
what they're doing.
- 1534. There's this chart, it goes like this...
It shows the decision making chart.
- 1535. It's a chart... It's, it's...
it's shaped like this.
- 1536. - Hum hum...
- So up here it says "POTUS"
- 1537. That's the decision making
chart for each... one.
- 1538. And...
- 1539. And it's so political...
- 1540. This is... This part's amazing.
- 1541. That's...
- 1542. That's fucking ridiculous.
- 1543. This... This is... it's so shocking.
- 1544. That's...
- 1545. No, I know...
- 1546. That's...
- 1547. I know...
- 1548. There are 1.2 m people on various stages
of their watch list.
- 1549. The population of an entire country.
- 1550. I know.
- 1551. That's... what we're working on.
- 1552. That person is incredibly
bold, but, uh...
- 1553. But also very well aware.
- 1554. Right. I... You know, I just hope.
- 1555. No, I mean...
- 1556. the boldness of it is shocking,
but I mean it was obviously...
- 1557. But the other thing is just...
- 1558. motivated by what you did,
I mean, it...
- 1559. This is going to... This is going to...
- 1560. That could raise a profile
- 1561. of this whole political situation
- 1562. with whistleblowing
to a whole new level, because...
- 1563. exactly...
- 1564. It's gonna...
- 1565. Yeah, I mean...
- 1566. I actually think
that's a great thing.
- 1567. And I think people
are gonna see what's being hidden...
- 1568. again, again...
By a totally different part.